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Abstract 
The promulgation of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, a declining share of federal research 
expenditures to the university, and the enforcement of intellectual property rights have 
contributed to the evolution of university research missions.  This thesis sought to understand 
how the intellectual property policies and commercialization initiatives at research universities 
affect their commercialization activities and intensity.   
The ability of universities to engage in commercialization activities is dependent on the 
willingness of the researchers to disclose their inventions.  We used cross-sectional data from 
AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers) and other sources to evaluate the 
effect universities intellectual property policies and other factors on faculty willingness to 
disclose their inventions and discoveries.  
The research revealed that universities’ commercialization efforts have been intensifying 
over the years and across the institution.  Intellectual property policies were found to have 
insignificant effect on the number of disclosures.  This supports earlier research that has shown 
many faculty members were ignorant about such policies.  On the other hand, licensing revenue, 
which basically goes to fund future research, was a very significant factor in disclosures and 
hence commercialization initiatives at universities.   
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, research universities have had the mission of improving the quality of life 
of the public through the public disclosure of research results.  This mission is supported by the 
current academic reward structure that encourages the production of knowledge that is useful and 
can be considered as scholarship.  Scholarship has frequently taken the narrow view of the 
production of knowledge that is published in scholarly journals and cited in other research papers 
(Cole, 1978; Diamond, 1986; Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stern, 1999).  However, some 
institutions are challenging this narrow view of scholarship and encouraging their researchers to 
exhibit scholarship through the commercialization of their inventions and discoveries.  This 
approach has been supported immensely by the promulgation of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) and 
the changing financial environment at many research institutions.     
However, because academic promotion and tenure considerations are still based, for the 
most part, on the traditional definition of scholarship; research faculty, frequently, have the 
opportunity to choose whether or not to disclose one’s inventions and discoveries.  Such choices 
include making decisions on the following areas: (1) what research funding collaborations to 
pursue, (2) whether or not to disclose and/or patent an invention, and (3) whether or not to 
pursue commercialization (Renault, 2006).  The decisions, however, are influenced by numerous 
exogenous factors including explicit and implicit constraints at the university.  Explicit 
constraints include the university’s intellectual property policy and the commercial opportunities 
in the researcher’s discipline.  Implicit constraints, on the other had, include the embedded 
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university emphasis on publishing research as well as in the riskiness of commercialization 
(Renault, 2006).  
It is argued that intellectual property policies are the foundation to creating the 
environment that encourages invention disclosures to university technology transfer officials 
(Renault, 2006; Goldbard and Henrekson, 2003).  Commercialization initiatives at the university 
are aimed to enhance the commercialization intensity of inventions.  Researchers have argued 
that universities are not encouraging commercialization with their intellectual property policies 
and commercialization initiatives.  Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003) indicate that successful 
commercialization of inventions requires faculty involvement and that the current university 
environment, intellectual property policies and commercialization initiatives discourage 
commercialization.  The results from commercialization, often, gets invested in future research, 
enhancing the university research mission (Etzkowitz, 2003).   
It is often argued that intellectual property policies influence the number of disclosures 
(Renault, 2006).  The relationship between intellectual property policies and disclosures 
presented in Figure 1.1 shows that policies can have positive or negative effects on disclosures, 
but that a positive relationship between the number of disclosures, intellectual protection and 
intellectual property protection positively influences successful commercialization.  The reaction 
is simple:  the more patented products an institution has, the greater its chances of successfully 
commercializing some of them.  Finally, the greater the success of commercialization initiatives, 
the greater the research revenues generated to fund future research that leads to higher levels of 
commercialization.     
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Figure 1.1-Impact of Intellectual Property Policies 
 
Policy makers at the state and national level are reforming laws relative to intellectual 
property protection and ownership that improve commercialization success and encourage 
university technology transfer (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).  Recently, four state legislatures 
have reformed state statutes that impact commercialization success.  The States of Virginia and 
North Dakota amended state statutes to allow for the open assignment of intellectual property 
developed within any of its state supported universities.  During 2007, Maine and New York 
legislatures were studying comprehensive intellectual property policy reform (Renault et al., 
2007).  Understanding the effect of intellectual property policies on the model presented in 
Figure 1.1 is important in helping university administrator’s structure their intellectual property 
policies to maximize commercialization success.  This is more critical as institutions, especially 
public universities and Land Grant Universities continue to address financing challenges from 
state and federal sources.    
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1.2 The Research Question 
The principle question this research answers is this: How important are intellectual 
property policies at institutions in explaining commercialization initiatives?  The definition of 
commercialization for this thesis begins with the disclosures of inventions and discoveries.  The 
importance of this question rests on the fact that many are arguing that relaxing policies and 
allowing inventors and researchers higher proportions of ownership would increase disclosures 
and consequently commercialization.  The outcome of this research, then, would help define the 
direction of policy amendments to improve the success of commercialization initiatives in 
universities.    
1.3 The Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to determine what impact intellectual property 
policies have on commercialization initiatives at research universities.  The specific research 
objectives are as follows: 
1) Classify and describe the different intellectual property policies existing in select research 
universities.   
2) Assess the extent of commercialization efforts at these select universities.   
3) Determine the extent to which intellectual property policies influence commercialization 
initiatives at these select research universities and institutions.   
1.4 Methods 
Two approaches were used to achieve the research objectives of this thesis project: (1) 
Literature review, and (2) econometric and statistical analysis.  The literature review aimed to 
understand the relationships that exist between research, intellectual property output and 
commercialization.  The literature review provided the information to complete the first 
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objective.  The literature covered included: academic journals and research publications, 
intellectual property policies at research universities, and secondary data from private, 
government, and professional organizations like the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM).  Cross-sectional data was collected from various locations such as AUTM 
and developed policy classification data from the literature review.  These provided the input for 
conducting statistical and econometric analyses to address objectives two and three.  These 
analyses were conducted using Stata 9.2.     
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:  Chapter 2 presents the literature 
review of the relationships that exist between research, intellectual property output and 
commercialization, and the impacts that universities initiatives have on commercialization 
initiatives at the institution.  In Chapter 3, the data collection methods and models are described 
in detail.  The hypotheses that are tested using the econometric models are also defined in 
Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results and analyses of the econometric and 
statistical models.  Chapter 5 provides the conclusions from the thesis research and suggestions 
for future research in the academy. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Developments of Research Institutions 
American higher education institutions have gone through two different revolutions.  
Starting in the 19th century, the first academic revolution combined research with teaching as a 
function of the university (Storr, 1952; Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965; Jencks and Reismann, 
1968; Etzkowitz, 2003).  In the 20th century, the second academic revolution combined economic 
development through commercialization with teaching and research as a function of the 
university (Etzkowitz, 2003).  Etzkowitz (1983) identifies four events in 1980 as the catalysts of 
change that accelerated the second academic revolution: a decline in federal research funding; 
the emergence of biotechnology; the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Supreme Court decision in 
Diamond vs. Chakrabarty.   
A commitment to the open dissemination of research results to benefit the public had 
been the traditional view of academics in the pre-Bayh-Dole era.   Due to the legislative events in 
1980, private industry demands have driven universities away from that tradition (Feller, 1990).  
On December 12, 1980 the United States Congress passed Public Law 96-517, the Patent and 
Trademark Act Amendments of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat 3015), also known as the Bayh-
Dole Act.  The Act created uniform patent policy enabling small businesses and not-for-profit 
organizations, including universities, to retain title to inventions made under federally-funded 
research programs.  Now, universities could commercialize inventions and discoveries 
emanating from researchers’ efforts even when the research resulted in inventions and 
discoveries funded by the federal government.  As a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, research 
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universities became more interested in the private returns from commercialization, and those 
universities already involved in commercialization, such as MIT, Stanford, University of 
California and University of Wisconsin, became more focused on those opportunities 
(Henderson et al., 1998).  From 1975 to 1992, 224 universities were issued at least one patent, 
but prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, 81 of those universities had no patents issued in their names and 
only 51 universities had more than 10 patents issued (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002).  Some 
researchers have argued that the legislation may have as significant an impact on U.S. innovation 
and economic development as the Morrill Land-Grant Act (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).   
Academic commercialization is defined as institutional and professorial market or 
market-like efforts to secure external money (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).  Faculty members 
committed to academic commercialization believe that the public benefits are attained through 
the commercialization of their inventions.  As these views evolved, tension between mobilizing 
knowledge found at a university as a public good and controlling its value as a profitable venture 
increased (Arrow, 1962; David and Foray, 1995; Foray, 1997).  This tension is illustrated by a 
case at Harvard University in the 1980’s.  Harvard proposed taking an equity position in a 
company that was founded by one of its molecular biologists to commercialize the innovation 
resulting from the research conducted in its laboratory (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).  
Opposition to Harvard’s action was wide-spread:  Harvard faculty, alumni and even the New 
York Times expressed concern about the university becoming engaged in a for-profit enterprise.  
Etzkowitz, et al (2000) notes that it is impossible to get all faculty to support the 
commercialization direction at universities.  However, other researchers argued that these 
traditional views and innovation strategies are not conflicting.  For example, as noted by Odza 
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(1999), universities most successful in creating spin-off firms are also the most successful in 
securing federal research dollars.   
2.1.1 Benefits and Consequences of University Commercialization Efforts  
There are benefits to commercializing research. Such efforts have allowed some research 
universities to collaborate with industrial research sponsors.  Researchers argue that the decline 
in public funding to research institutions have forced universities to become more entrepreneurial 
in their search for industrial funding sources to continue current research programs (Hackett, 
1990).  It is a common perception among many government leaders that industry-sponsored 
research funding can fill the funding void left by government.  However, some researchers 
suggest that industry funding alone will never fill the void of declining federal research dollars.  
To completely fill federal research gaps, Campbell and Slaughter (1999) state that industry 
contributions would have to more than double.  Data collected by AUTM shows that industry 
research and development expenditures to universities have remained constant over the past few 
years, showing that only 7 percent of research and development expenditures at research 
institutions for 2002-2005 come from private corporations (AUTM, 2006).     
The emphasis on commercialization efforts has also brought about opportunities for 
economic development initiatives for rural communities and research universities to become 
financially independent of state appropriations (Etzkowitz, 2003).  Entrepreneurial universities 
can enhance economic and social utility by formulating academic goals and knowledge creation 
into strategic commercialization efforts (Clark, 1998).  An example of this can be found at 
Polytechnic Milian, where their first noteworthy commercialization deal resulted in a return to a 
faculty member equivalent to four-years’ salary (Etzkowitz, 2003).  That achievement at 
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Polytechnic Milian garnered the attention of other faulty members and helped motivate and 
increase their interest and commitment to the university’s commercialization efforts.   
Other benefits of commercialization initiatives at research universities include increased 
competitiveness in the recruitment of students, specifically graduate students; increased 
competitiveness in attracting prominent faculty focused on commercialization; and increased 
success in competing for research funding and support.  The relationships with industry also 
create great educational opportunities for students at research universities, as well as create 
additional jobs at the local, state and national levels for students with advanced degrees (Renault 
et al., 2007).          
While keeping the benefits in perspective, it is important to recognize the concerns 
related to commercialization initiatives at universities.  First, faculty members have lobbied for a 
reduction in their teaching responsibilities to focus more on research and development 
(Etzkowitz, 2003).  Commercialization initiatives have also encouraged increased involvement 
with industry.   As the industry-university relationship grows, the fear is that the public service 
sector of the university will evolve into a “service-for-fee” rather than for free (Campbell and 
Slaughter, 1999).   
Some researchers argue that the financial interests in research negatively impact faculty 
members research direction (Krimsky, 1991).  This is particularly important because of the fear 
that industry could draw researchers away from basic research to focus more on applied research 
that is more profitable for the private sector.  Some economists are worried that future economic 
growth could be stunted as universities reduce basic research that has the biggest impact as a 
public good and is the foundation of all other applied research (Dasgute and David, 1987).   
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Overall, the new emphasis on academic commercialization has created a debate at 
research universities on the proper role of disclosure and commercialization efforts at 
institutions.  This debate has only increased the importance of the institutional intellectual 
property policies and initiatives at universities.   
2.2 Intellectual Property Policies 
The environment for commercialization at universities is defined by intellectual property 
policies.  In studying the disclosure dynamics at research universities, Jensen, et al (2003, p. 
1,272) note, “many technology transfer office directors believe that substantially less than half of 
the inventions with commercial potential are disclosed to their office.”  It is a long held belief 
that intellectual property policies influence an inventor’s decision regarding the disclosure and 
commercialization of intellectual property.  A study of 98 faculty entrepreneurs at five research 
universities found that faculty reward systems and technology transfer office practices influenced 
the commercialization decisions of researchers (Siegel et al., 2003).  To facilitate 
commercialization, an inventor must see in the university environment market incentives for the 
invention and not disincentives (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).  Research conducted by Jensen 
and Thursby (2001) found that 71 percent of intellectual property required further involvement 
by the researcher to be commercialized successfully.  Institutional policies can create the 
incentives for the researcher to disclose and participate in entrepreneurial activities.  When the 
university intellectual property policies create a model of collaboration between sponsors, 
faculty, the institution and commercial interests the potential benefits of innovation are more 
likely to be fully realized (Moses III and Martin, 2001).   
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2.2.1 Ownership Policies 
Institutional intellectual property policies outline different ownership policies for a 
number of reasons.  Initially, it would be easy to assume that the inventor is the best owner of 
intellectual property.  However, some argue that awarding intellectual property ownership to 
inventors does not create the best environment to ensure commercialization success (Goldfarb 
and Henrekson, 2003).  Shane (2002), for example argues that inventors do not have the 
necessary skills and competences needed to successfully develop commercial markets for their 
inventions.   
The assessment of intellectual property policies begins by looking first at Sweden.  The 
Swedish government has consistently invested significant financial resources in research and 
development at universities.  Over the last decade, it has been the world leader in research and 
development expenditures on a per capita basis (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).  Sweden has 
also been a world leader in terms of publications in academic journals.  Because of its research 
and development success, it is easy to assume that it would also be a world leader in intellectual 
property commercialization.  However, this is not the case.  In 1949, the Swedish government 
passed legislation providing academic freedom to researchers, as well as placing intellectual 
property resulting from their research in the inventor’s control.  Research has found that this 
policy led Swedish universities to have little incentive to facilitate commercialization activities 
(Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).  Some studies on the Swedish experiment have concluded that 
the lack success in commercializing university intellectual property was because university 
researchers do not have the professional expertise and no professional incentive to engage in 
such commercialization activities (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).   
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In the United States, on the other hand, there is no national policy on ownership of 
intellectual property.  Rather institutions are at liberty to develop and implement IP policies they 
deem provide the best incentives for performance.  For example in 1994, Stanford University, 
after two years of faculty senate debate, deemed it appropriate for the university to own 
intellectual property instead of their traditional policy of inventors owning the innovation 
(Shane, 2002).  Policies granting ownership to the university, instead of the inventors, are now 
preferred because pursuing commercialization through commercialization firms increases the 
probably that the intellectual property with commercial value will be developed and reach the 
market (Shane, 2002).   
The business side of intellectual property protection also affects the ownership policies at 
research universities.  Universities are claiming ownership over inventions, allowing them to 
make decisions regarding intellectual property protection.  These ownership claims present 
financial consequences to universities (Matkin, 1990).   
Ownership of inventions is also affected by the intellectual property agreements with 
research sponsors.  Research shows that industry-funded projects have increased the demand for 
patent protection at universities (Henderson et al., 1998).  Some universities, such as UCLA, 
allow sponsors the first right of refusal to negotiate more specific, and even in some instances, 
exclusive licensing rights to the product of research they funded (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).   
2.2.2 Royalty Sharing Policies 
The traditional views and reward systems at research universities fail to recognize the 
commercialization achievements of a faculty member as a professional accomplishment.  Due to 
this failure, researchers face high opportunities costs when they engage in commercialization 
activities (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).  Therefore, incentives must be provided to faculty 
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inventors to encourage them to disclose their inventions and participate in the commercialization 
process.  Siegel, et al. (2003) argues that institutional royalty sharing policies influence 
researchers’ decision to collaborate with industry and whether to disclose and pursue patent 
protection.  Renault (2006) on faculty members committed to commercialization of intellectual 
property, using logistical-regressions, found that the revenue splits was the strongest influence on 
a faculty members’ decision to disclose and commercialize.  They argue that generous royalty 
sharing policies encourage faculty members to stay engaged in the commercialization process, 
especially when their involvement is needed to avoid commercialization failure.  Different 
options in providing financial incentives to researchers exist.  For example, one option is an 
increase in salary.  Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003) consider this to be the weakest option 
because it provides less incentive for the researcher to be involved in the commercialization 
process as their salary increase is not tied to the commercialization outcome.  They argue that the 
best incentives to offer researchers is a royalty sharing payment structure that rewards 
commercialization success or provides equity compensation in start-up ventures.   
2.2.3 Tenure and Promotion Policies 
Intellectual property policies at universities may require faculty members to disclose 
innovation and to share in royalties resulting from university research, but those policies are 
overshadowed by other more fundamental policies, such as tenure and promotion policies 
(Renault, 2006).  Traditionally, to gain promotion and tenure a university faculty member must 
demonstrate that one has contributed to public knowledge (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).  
Those contributions are made through public disclosure of research results in academic articles 
and journals, extension publication or public workshops.  While universities maintain different 
levels of required achievement, all universities tend to reward academic research achievements 
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and not commercial accomplishments (Argyres and Leibeskind, 1998).  This reward structure 
implies disincentives for faculty members to engage in commercialization activities.  
Until commercialization activities are recognized as evidence of academic scholarship 
and used in tenure and promotion activities, faculty’s willingness to participate in them will be 
weak (Renault, 2006).  Indeed, some institutions have recognized this and are responding 
appropriately.  For example, the United Kingdom Higher Education Funding Council, the 
legislative governing body of higher education institutions, has requested that patents and 
commercialization success be held as evidence of “quality research” (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).  
Similarly, rewarding commercialization activities could be recognized by treating patents as an 
equivalent to publications, and/or measuring the interaction with corporate sponsors, and valuing 
licensing and start-ups formed using some type of metric (Renault, 2006).  Although some U.S. 
universities may be rewarding commercialization activities as quality research, to this point it is 
not a common practice.     
However, promotion and tenure based on non-traditional academic activities could lead 
to its own challenges.  For example, it may lead to further cuts in public financial support or to 
direct intervention by trustees or state legislatures (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).  Changes to 
the tenure and promotion process may also affect faculty roles at universities.  A hierarchy of 
faculty, according to the university appointment, could create or continue to develop differences 
in the value of faculty members according to their university appointment.  As 
commercialization is rewarded in the tenure and promotion process, it has been argued that 
researchers may focus solely on increasing publications and commercialization activities to 
increase their prestige and income at the expense of traditional teaching responsibility (Campbell 
and Slaughter, 1999).  This implies that faculty members not engaged in commercialization will 
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need to increase their role in teaching and advising, which may not be seen as important by 
university administrators when considering to the financial benefits of commercialization 
activities.    
Another important consideration is that tenure and promotion policies are generally 
uniform university standards that apply to all academic departments.  Argyres and Liebeskind 
(1998) argue that involvement in commercialized ventures could create envy problems among 
faculty members in a department or across a university.  The problem of envy is important as 
faculty members could positively or negatively affect the tenure process through their 
involvement on tenure and promotion committees.   
It is important for university and technology transfer officials to understand that not all 
faculty members support the commercialization of intellectual property.  For commercialization 
to be successful, faculty members must be aware of and support university intellectual property 
policies and commercialization initiatives.  Overall, the policies must provide proper incentives 
for faculty members to participate in commercialization efforts.   
2.3 Institutional Commercialization Strategies and Resources 
Conflicting views exist on how to adequately define commercialization success.  Success 
is argued to be determined by more than just invention disclosures, patents filed and issued, 
licenses executed, and start-ups formed, which is the focus of the AUTM Licensing Survey.  
Renault, et al. (2007) believes that the full impact of commercialization success also needs to 
include the benefits to the public and the quality-of-life improvement made in society.  However, 
the subjective nature of quality-of-life improvements makes it tough to quantify the full impact 
of commercialized innovation.  Therefore, commercialization success is defined generally as 
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successful innovative outcomes from the proportion of patents issued, licenses executed, and 
spin-offs formed on the number of disclosures per year (Renault, 2006). 
2.3.1 Institutional Commercialization Strategies 
Many objectives exist in commercialization development that defines the purpose of 
commercialization and technology transfer.  The objectives related to technology transfer can be 
diverse and controversial, yet are important because it sets the universities foundation for 
commercialization strategy.  Argyres and Liebeskind (1998) argue some universities such as 
MIT, Georgia Tech, and select land-grant universities interpret their technology transfer 
activities and commercialization efforts as a way to contribute to society; thus, fulfilling the 
social mission of the university.  Other universities and faculty members doubt that technology 
transfer is a way to fulfill the university’s social mission.  For example, the faculty senate at 
Stanford University debated an entire year over whether “generating income for the university” 
should be added as an objective for the technology transfer mission focused on, “technology 
transfer for society’s use and benefit”  (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998).   
A number of commercialization strategies prevail at universities.  Those strategies ensure 
that inventions emanating from university research realize their full commercialization potential.  
First, as universities aim to become more efficient and effective at commercialization, 
administrators prefer to work with established commercialization firms that have a comparative 
advantage in commercializing specific inventions (Shane, 2002).  To ensure commercialization 
success it is necessary to complete tasks such as identifying customer needs, developing product 
concepts, designing products and process, prototyping, and manufacturing (Shane, 2002).  It can 
be assumed many inventors of intellectual property do not have the skills needed to successfully 
commercialize products.  Universities also find it difficult to successfully commercialize 
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innovations, as their comparative advantage is delivering education services, not in 
manufacturing goods (Scott, 2004).  The advantage of working with established 
commercialization firms is that the added risk in the development of new firms is avoided as the 
established commercialization firms have the resources needed to develop, market and 
commercialize the invention (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).  Another strategy important to 
commercialization success is commercialization pathways.  Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003) 
concluded that inventions had increased chances of reaching full market potential when broader 
menus of commercialization pathway options were available.  The intellectual property 
commercialization pathway options include sale, licensing (non-exclusive or exclusive), joint 
ventures (equity or non-equity), or start-ups (external or internal).   
Commercialization strategies at universities also focus on specific industries.  Industries 
differ significantly in both technological opportunity and ability that offer economic incentives to 
protect intellectual property (Elevorkick et al., 1995).  Universities should only pursue 
commercialization pathways in areas that intellectual property protection is effective.  Patents 
impose transaction costs, and universities are only willing to incur those costs if potential 
revenue exceeds the costs of patenting.  As universities focus more on private economic return, 
they have incentives to patent in areas where commercialization is most effective (Shane, 2004).  
Results from a study by Shane (2004) confirm that since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, 
universities have put a greater emphasis on lines of business where patenting is indeed more 
effective in producing returns.   
2.3.2 Institutional Commercialization Resources 
As a result of the four events of 1980 that began the academic commercialization 
revolution, most research universities, who did not already have a formal technology transfer 
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agency created one to facilitate the commercialization of campus inventions (Liebeskind, 2001).  
Those agencies handle the intellectual property disclosed to the university and secure intellectual 
property protection, if it is deemed appropriate.  Technology transfer agencies benefit the 
commercialization process by taking intellectual property through additional development 
processes, thereby decreasing its economic uncertainty and risk (Arrow, 1962).  Academic 
researchers also benefit from the various networks that technology transfer offices have through 
their professional interactions.  The offices are efficient in helping researchers find and secure 
financial resources for innovative research projects (Etzkowitz, 2003).  Other benefits to the 
inventors include handling royalty collection processes, marketing of the technology, handling 
legal and paper-work processes, which all saves time for the faculty so the researcher can 
dedicate full time to research endeavors.   
The benefits of technology transfer offices are only realized if the relationship with the 
office is viewed as favorable.  Shane and Cable (1998) found that the social relationship between 
licensing officials, inventors and industry representatives affect the disclosure and 
commercialization processes, particularly in the case of start-up ventures.  However, not all 
researchers are supportive of technology transfer offices as a resource to assist in the 
commercialization process of inventions.  Researchers argue that such resources that add an 
administrative office in between them and their corporate sponsor strain the industrial network 
they have worked to create (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).  
2.4 Observations from Literature 
The literature review has shown important features to consider in regard to the 
commercialization of intellectual property and the role and impact that university intellectual 
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property policies and initiatives may play in the commercialization process.  The following are a 
summary of the critical observations from the literature: 
• Research institutions are emphasizing and benefiting from the commercialization of 
inventions and discoveries emanating from their faculty.   
• Intellectual property policies influence the entrepreneurial environment for academic 
researchers to seek commercialization opportunities, specifically through ownership 
and royalty sharing. 
• Commercialization of inventions and discoveries are influenced by the institutional 
policies, initiatives, and resources available to the inventor.   
The next section discusses the data collection methods, models and hypotheses.   
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CHAPTER 3 - DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data Collection 
The overall objective of this thesis study was to analyze the impact that intellectual 
property policies on commercialization initiatives.  To achieve this objective the intellectual 
property policies at select research institutions in the United States and Canada were analyzed, as 
well as secondary data to determine their impact on technology transfer and commercialization 
initiatives.   
The research universities and institutions were selected using the 2006 Top American 
Research Universities annual report from The Center for Measuring University Performance 
(2006).  Specifically, the top 50 private and top 50 public research institutions identified by the 
organization’s 2006 study were selected.  They were supplemented by the remaining land-grant 
research institutions not making the top 50 public institution criteria, as well as four universities 
from Canada.  The sample was then narrowed to 91 universities which participated in The 
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) Licensing Activity Report in both 
1996 and 2006.  The list of public and private research institutions selected for this thesis are list 
in Table 3.1 below.   
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Table 3.1-List of Research Universities and Institutions Used for the Study 
Private Institutions:
Arizona State University University of Guelph Baylor College of Medicine
Auburn University University of Hawaii California Institute of Technology
Clemson University University of Idaho Carnegie Mellon University
Colorado State University University of Illinois Case Western Reserve University
Florida State University University of Iowa Cornell University
Indiana University University of Kansas Dartmouth College
Iowa State University University of Kentucky Emory University
Kansas State University University of Maryland Georgetown University
Louisiana State University University of Massachusetts Georgia Institute of Technology
Michigan State University University of Michigan Harvard University
Mississippi State University University of Minnesota Johns Hopkins University
Montana State University University of Missouri Massachusetts Institute of Technology
New Mexico State University University of Nebraska New York University
North Dakota State University University of New Hampshire Northwestern University
Ohio State University University of New Mexico Stanford University
Oklahoma State University University of North Carolina Tufts University
Oregon Health Science University University of Oregon Tulane University
Oregon State University University of Pittsburgh University of Chicago
Penn State University University of Rhode Island University of Miami
Purdue University University of South Carolina University of Pennsylvania
Rutgers University of South Florida University of Rochester
Texas A&M University University of Tennessee University of Southern California
University of Alabama University of Texas Vanderbilt University
University of Arizona University of Toronto Wake Forest University
University of Arkansas University of Utah Washington University, St. Louis
University of British Columbia University of Virginia
University of California University of Washington
University of Cincinnati University of Western Ontario
University of Colorado University of Wisconsin
University of Connecticut Virginia Tech University
University of Delaware Washington State University
University of Florida Waterloo University
University of Georgia Wayne State University
Public Institutions:
 
3.1.1 Analysis of Intellectual Property Policies 
Intellectual property policies were collected for each of the research universities and 
institutions identified in Table 3.1.  To collect the policies the website for each institution was 
reviewed.  Most policies could be located under the “research” link of the website.  Within the 
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research section of the website, the institutions policy could most often be found under links 
including: “policies and procedures”, “Office of Technology Transfer”, “Office of 
Commercialization”, “Office of Research Administration”, “Vice Provost for Research” or 
“inventor’s information”.  In some instances it was necessary to initiate a key-word search of the 
institutions website using the following phases: “intellectual property policy”, “patent policy”, 
“technology transfer”, or “faculty handbook”. 
Upon collection of the intellectual property policies of those research universities, the 
policies were organized into three categories: ownership policies; revenue distribution; and 
disclosure turn-around-time rules.  The ownership policy analysis aimed to determine the 
ownership rules of the institution.  Ownership options were as follows:  
• Complete university ownership  
• Complete sponsor ownership  
• Complete inventor ownership  
• University and sponsor shared ownership  
• University and inventor shared ownership, or 
• University, sponsor, inventor shared ownership.   
The ownership option for each individual university policy was coded in a dummy variable form.  
The ownership strategy analysis also included determining the policy rules that defined the 
ownership determination process for sponsored research.  The ownership process was organized 
into three options as follows:  
• Determined by the sponsorship agreements  
• The university normally owns the intellectual property, or  
• Complete university ownership due to the creation happening on campus.  
Again, dummy variables were used to represent the options used in the econometric model. 
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The second part of the analysis for the intellectual property policies aimed to determine 
the revenue distribution or royalty sharing policy at each university.  First, the determination was 
made as to who or what groups received the income emanating from intellectual property.  Again 
the analysis was in the form of a binary dummy variable.  Possible individuals or group options 
were as follows:  
• Creator(s)  
• University  
• Technology foundation  
• Combination of the creator(s) and university  
• Combination of the creator(s) and technology foundation  
• Combination of the university and technology foundation, or 
• Combination of the creator(s), university, and technology foundation.   
Next, information was gathered on the inventor’s portion of net royalty income as a 
percent of total revenues.  The inventor’s share of royalty revenue includes both personal and 
professional income received.  In instances where the policy did not outline a specific percent of 
revenue to be contributed to the researchers program, the inventors departmental or center’s 
share was added in their portion of royalty sharing.  Unless otherwise indicated, the remaining 
potion was considered university revenue.   
Turn-around-time was the final component analyzed in the intellectual property policies 
at research universities.  Turn-around-time in this study is defined as the amount of time between 
disclosure and when the university must notify the inventor regarding its decision on intellectual 
property protection and commercialization.  First, we determined who made the technology 
transfer decision regarding intellectual property protection and commercialization.  The options 
related to the decision-maker included:  
• University (university president, vice-president of research, provost)  
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• Agency (Office of Technology Transfer, Office of Commercialization, Patent 
Committee, Intellectual Property Committee)  
• Creator(s), and  
• Other. 
The intellectual property protection and commercialization decision-maker, as outlined by the 
intellectual property policy, was coded using dummy variables.  The turn-around-time identified 
in the policies was also coded with dummy variables as follows:  
• One month from disclosure (30 days)  
• Two months from disclosure (60 days)  
• Three months from disclosure (90 days)  
• Four months from disclosure (120 days)  
• Five months from disclosure (150 days)  
• Six months from disclosure (180 days) 
• One year from disclosure (365 days), or 
• Unspecified turn-around-time. 
Each of the variables and strategies examined in the analysis of each institution’s 
intellectual property policies is important to this study due to the impact it is assumed to have on 
the entrepreneurial spirit of the university and the university inventors.  The variables above 
were used in building the economic models to determine how intellectual property policies and 
commercialization initiatives impact disclosures of intellectual property, commercialization 
intensity and revenue generated by the university.   
3.1.2 Secondary Data Collection 
Since 1990, AUTM has conducted an annual Licensing Activity Survey of all member 
research universities in both the United States and Canada.  Participation in the licensing activity 
survey is voluntary.  The objective of the survey is to provide technology transfer professionals 
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and the general public with research funding and research output specific to each institution.  The 
survey also helps the general public better understand research activities and their benefits 
(AUTM, 2007).  The licensing survey results specific to each year have been published in an 
annual report since FY 1995 and made available to technology transfer professionals and the 
general public.  The data shared in each licensing activity survey annual report have played an 
important role for other research studies and for other institutions in crafting intellectual property 
policies, and ways to improve research output, innovation and public-impact (AUTM, 2007).  
For this thesis project, we used AUTM’s data from FY 1996-FY 2006.  The variables utilized in 
this thesis analysis include:  total system research expenditures, disclosures to the university, 
U.S. patents issued, licensing options executed, start-up companies formed, and licensing income 
generated.   
The secondary data collected from AUTM is presented and organized in a panel format 
for cross-sectional econometric analysis.  According to Maddala (2001) the main advantage of 
panel data is to have the ability to compare a series of non-overlapping cross-section units to test 
implicit results.   
The data were analyzed in Stata 9.2 and tested using econometric methods.  Through 
intuition several hypotheses were developed that assess the relationships between research 
institutions intellectual property policies and institutional commercialization initiatives and their 
impact on commercialization success at the research university.  These hypotheses are tested and 
the results are reported in Chapter 4. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
A general knowledge and understanding on how commercialization activities at the 
university are influenced has thus far been developed.  The objective with this cross-sectional 
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analysis is to determine how commercialization initiatives are influenced by university policies.  
To this end, the following hypotheses are developed and tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The literature review indicated that disclosures increase as commercialization 
activity increases.  This is due to the faculty having a better understanding of the benefits 
and rewards of commercialization.  To this end, the hypothesis is that prior successful 
commercialization initiatives positively influence the disclosures of inventions and 
discoveries:  
Ho: 0>∂
∂
X
Y     Ha: 0≤∂
∂
X
Y  
where X is: PI=patents issued, LE=licenses executed, SUP=start-ups formed and 
IRI=royalty sharing policy with the inventor. 
Hypothesis 2: The literature review indicated that commercialization intensity is increasing 
over time.  This is due to many factors including a decline in research expenditures and a 
way to fulfill the social mission of the university.  To this end, the hypothesis is that 
commercialization intensity is higher at research universities in 2006 than in 1996:  
Ho: 019962006 >− ββ     Ha: 019962006 ≤− ββ   
where β is: Y=disclosures, SRE=system research expenditures, PI=patents issued, 
LE=licenses executed, SUP=start-ups formed, and LICINC=licensing income.  
Hypothesis 3: The literature review indicated that past disclosures and licensing income 
contribute to further research at the institutions.  It is believed that research expenditures 
have a similar impact on future disclosures, as well as licensing income on future 
research expenditures.  To this end, the hypothesis is that the independent variables will 
have a lag effect on the dependent variable.  The independent variable coefficients will 
increase and then decrease going backward in time, with the significance of the variable 
increasing moving in the same direction.   
Hypothesis 4: Intellectual property policies define how researchers must behave and how 
they are rewarded for their inventions and discoveries.  The literature indicated these 
polices do define and affect the environment within institutions and may influence the 
number of discoveries and commercialization activities that occur.  To this end, the 
hypothesis is that the environment created by intellectual property policies has a 
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significant influence on the disclosures and commercialization activities at research 
universities.     
   
The next section discusses the results for the hypotheses and the analysis of objectives 
two and three.   
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CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The review of the literature indicated that the entrepreneurial orientation at research 
universities is evolving and intellectual property policies at the university may be influencing 
commercialization activities at universities.  In this chapter the results from the analysis is 
presented.  The discussion in this chapter includes the analysis and descriptive statistics of the 
intellectual property policies of the universities in our sample, the descriptive statistics of the 
data collected from AUTM and the results of the hypotheses.   
4.1 University Intellectual Property Policy Analysis 
Objective 1 of this thesis was to evaluate the intellectual property policies at different 
research universities and institutions.  The intellectual property policy analysis was designed to 
cover six policy areas believed to impact commercialization, including:  
• Ownership options 
• Ownership strategy for sponsored research  
• Groups sharing in royalties received from commercialization  
• Inventors portion of shared royalties from commercialization  
• The decision maker determining if IP protection and commercialization should be 
pursued, and  
• The decision turn-around-time from invention disclosure.   
This type of analysis is believed to be the first of its kind.  The summary statistics from 
the policy analysis of these initiatives are presented in following sub-sections.  The rationale is to 
attempt to understand the policy strategies and characteristics being employed at public and 
private research universities. 
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4.1.1 University Ownership Options 
Our review of university intellectual property policies reveals that most university 
intellectual property is owned by the university or is shared between the university and the 
research sponsor (Table 4.1).  Fifty-six universities in the sample practice an ownership policy 
where they completely own the resulting innovation, while 31 universities share the intellectual 
property with the research sponsor.  The University of Toronto’s ownership policy is shared 
ownership between the university and the inventor, while the University of Waterloo, the 
University of Wisconsin, and the University of Western Ontario’s ownership policy is shared 
ownership between the research sponsor and the inventor. These policies are important because 
they define the type of commercialization strategy pursued.  Specifically, the University of 
Toronto’s ownership policy has led to a higher proportion of start-ups companies being formed, 
where from 1997 to 2000 nearly 10 percent of disclosures led to start-up companies being 
formed.  Public universities were the only institutions that practiced the non-traditional 
ownership strategy where the sponsor/inventor and university/inventor share ownership of 
intellectual property (Figure 4.1).  This could be an indication that private universities operate 
similar to a corporate research culture where boards and administrators make all 
commercialization decisions.       
Table 4.1-Intellectual Property Ownership Statistics 
n=91 Number of Universities:
University: 56
Sponsor: 31
Inventor and University: 1
Inventor and Sponsor 3  
 30
Figure 4.1-Public and Private Distribution of University Ownership Options 
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4.1.2 Ownership Strategies for Sponsored Research 
The analysis of intellectual property policies found that 32 universities are not willing to 
sacrifice ownership in a research sponsorship agreement, while 24 universities usually own the 
intellectual property, but are willing to transfer ownership within the context of a specific 
research agreement (Figure 4.2).  It is interesting to note that over 44 percent of the private 
university policies require that the university own the resulting intellectual property, while 68 
percent of public universities are within the other two categories.  This could indicate that public 
universities are more flexible with the sponsored research agreements in order to increase 
research expenditure and to better serve the public interest.   
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Figure 4.2-Public and Private Distribution of Ownership Strategies for Sponsored Research 
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4.1.3 University Groups Sharing in Royalties from IP Commercialization  
The analysis of university intellectual property policies indicated that a majority of 
intellectual property income distributed by the university is between the university and inventor 
or the inventor and the institutions technology foundation, with 51 and 21 universities practicing 
that type of policy respectively (Table 4.2).  An interesting observation is that only Waterloo 
University, a public university, rewards just the inventor with the royalty earned from intellectual 
property.  This policy could influence the type of commercialization pursued and the level of 
commercialization success.  An interpretation of rewarding only the inventor with 
commercialization income could mean that the university needs to provide more incentives to 
inventors to attract cutting-edge, innovative faculty.  A negative impact of rewarding only the 
inventor with royalty revenue could be that the university will offer little technology transfer 
assistance, therefore decreasing the number of disclosures that are actually commercialized.  This 
is an important issue because Shane (2002) observed in his research that inventors do not have 
the necessary skills needed to commercialize their technologies.    
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Table 4.2-Royalty Sharing Between University Groups 
n=91 Number of Universities:
Inventor: 1
University and Inventor: 51
Technology 
Foundation and Inventor: 21
Technology Foundation and 
University: 2
University, Technology 
Foundation and Inventor:
16
 
4.1.4 Inventors Portion in Royalty Sharing  
The analysis found the proportion of royalty income going to the inventor of intellectual 
property, as a percent, was normally distributed around the mean at approximately 49.19 percent.  
A mean-normal distribution can be observed in Figure 4.3 and is also confirmed by the skewness 
and kurtosis descriptive statistics in Table 4.3.  In Figure 4.3 is it important to observe that 64 
percent of private institutions share between 50 and 70 percent of income with the inventors.  
Another observation is that only 44 percent of public universities and institutions share over 50 
percent of net proceeds from intellectual property with the inventor.  Public universities also 
have a wide distribution of royalty sharing initiatives.  Again, this could be a result of public 
universities needing more attractive royalty sharing policies to attract innovative faculty 
members.  The distribution of policies also could be an indication that the entrepreneurial 
intensity is evolving in the public institution sector as they compete for research dollars, 
resources and faculty members.    
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Figure 4.3-Public and Private Distribution of the Inventors Portion of Royalty Income 
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4.1.5 IP Protection and Commercialization Decision-Maker 
Seventy-one intellectual property policies indicated that technology transfer agencies, 
professionals or committees determine whether or not to protect and commercialize intellectual 
property disclosed to the university (Table 4.3).  The next most frequent category, university 
administrators decide, is the policy practiced at 18 universities.  This is an important policy 
initiative to consider because research completed by Campbell and Slaughter (1999) found that 
administrators and faculty researchers differ on their view about who should control the future of 
the resulting inventions from research.  University administrators making intellectual property 
protection and commercialization decisions could negatively impact the number of disclosures at 
the university.  Administrators could also make naïve judgments on disclosures based on 
financial implications related to the potential technology markets for the intellectual property.  
These judgments could lead to university resources, time and money, wasted on intellectual 
property that will fail commercialization.  Only the University of Delaware leaves the 
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commercialization decision with the inventor, while the University of Wisconsin-Madison 
determines the future of intellectual property through its technology foundation. 
Table 4.3-Public and Private Distribution of IP Protection and Commercialization Decision-Maker 
n=91 Public: Private: Total:
University: 14 4 18
Agency: 50 21 71
Inventor: 1 0 1
Other: 1 0 1  
4.1.6 IP Protection and Commercialization Turn-Around-Time from Disclosure 
Universities have a variety of intellectual property protection and commercialization 
decision turn-around-time strategies.  The most common strategies found 39 institutional policies 
do not enforce a specific turn-around-time rule from the time when intellectual property is 
disclosed to the appropriate university agency.  Table 4.4 indicates that two institutions practice a 
30 days or less turn-around-time rule, both private institutions.  The figure also shows that 53 
percent of the universities sampled practice a turn-around-time decision rule of less than 180 
days.  The turn-around-time decision rule could be an important policy that affects disclosures to 
the university.  This is particularly important since publications are usually on hold during the 
process of evaluation.  Factors including the need for timely development of intellectual property 
to ensure that the creation is successfully commercialized (Shane, 2002) and tenure and 
promotion considerations should lead to faculty members to prefer and support a quick turn-
around-time.  
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Table 4.4-Public and Private Distribution of the Turn-Around-Time Decision Rule 
n=91 Public: Private: Total:
30 days: 0 2 2
60 days: 13 0 13
90 days: 12 6 18
120 days: 6 2 8
150 days: 1 0 1
180 days: 5 2 7
1 Year: 0 3 3
Unspecified: 29 10 39  
4.2 Variable Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the continuous variables included in the regression analysis 
are outlined in Table 4.5.  The descriptive statistics include an analysis of the mean, minimum, 
maximum, standard deviation and the skewness and kurtosis tests for each variable.  The 
descriptive statistics for each variable followed the time-trend expected.  Research expenditures, 
invention disclosures, patents issued, licenses executed and start-up companies formed increased 
each year over the eleven year period.  The average research expenditures for universities in 
1998 were $188.88 million and grew to over $394.07 million in 2006.  Over the 1996-2006 time 
period, the average number of invention disclosures increased from 80.4 to 159.62 per year, U.S. 
patents issued increased from 17.6 to 27.1 per year, licenses executed increased from 21.77 to 
27.1 per year, and start-up companies created increased from 1.85 to 4.4 per year.  These 
statistics indicate increasing commercialization efforts at research universities.  These statistics 
are consistent with AUTM facts that indicate 4,350 new products were launched in the market 
from FY 1998-FY 2006 and 5,724 new start-up companies had been created since the adoption 
of the Bayh-Dole act in 1980 (AUTM, 2007).  The descriptive statistics also show that licensing 
income has been volatile over the past eleven years.  In 1996 the average licensing income per  
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Table 4.5-Descriptive Statistics for the Continuous Variables Used in Regression Models 
Count Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
91 $188 $27 $1,518 $202 3.98 21.63
(0.26) (0.51)
91 80.4 0.0 670.0 90.8 3.60 19.51
(0.26) (0.51)
91 17.6 0.0 159.0 22.4 3.94 20.19
(0.26) (0.51)
91 21.8 0.0 137.0 27.5 2.38 6.44
(0.26) (0.51)
91 1.8 0.0 14.0 2.6 2.37 6.82
(0.26) (0.51)
91 $3 $0 $63 $8 5.49 34.40
(0.26) (0.51)
89 $256 $48 $2,085 $268 4.16 24.70
(0.26) (0.52)
89 105.0 7.0 865.0 116.4 3.68 20.40
(0.26) (0.52)
89 $10 $0 $262 $30 7.18 59.16
(0.26) (0.52)
86 $280 $48 $2,319 $302 4.24 24.94
(0.26) (0.53)
86 111.1 5.0 957.0 131.9 3.78 19.99
(0.26) (0.53)
86 $8 $0 $74 $14 3.10 10.33
(0.26) (0.53)
88 $315 $51 $2,418 $322 3.86 21.16
(0.26) (0.52)
89 120.3 8.0 973.0 131.8 3.69 19.76
(0.26) (0.52)
89 $8 $0 $82 $15 2.88 9.25
(0.26) (0.52)
89 $338 $58 $2,623 $349 3.87 21.23
(0.26) (0.52)
89 129.7 7.0 1,027.0 140.8 3.58 18.58
(0.26) (0.52)
89 $9 $0 $89 $14 3.04 11.83
(0.26) (0.52)
89 $361 $55 $2,792 $369 3.95 21.99
(0.26) (0.52)
90 140.0 10.0 1,196.0 158.0 3.93 22.27
(0.26) (0.52)
90 $10 $0 $116 $18 3.45 15.46
(0.26) (0.52)
86 $379 $55 $2,917 $392 3.91 21.13
(0.26) (0.53)
88 144.3 8.0 1,304.0 167.5 4.41 26.72
(0.26) (0.52)
87 $18 $0 $586 $65 7.99 69.03
(0.26) (0.53)
91 $394 $57 $3,036 $396 4.01 22.65
(0.26) (0.51)
91 159.6 14.0 1,308.0 171.4 3.92 22.26
(0.26) (0.51)
91 27.1 0.0 270.0 37.3 4.00 20.93
(0.26) (0.51)
91 40.5 1.0 226.0 39.9 2.11 5.59
(0.26) (0.51)
91 4.4 0.0 39.0 5.5 3.44 17.48
(0.26) (0.51)
91 $13 $0 $193 $29 4.70 25.22
(0.26) (0.51)
91 49.2 15.0 100.0 15.2 0.38 0.34
(0.26) (0.51)
Absolute values of standard errors in parentheses
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university was $3.45 million.  That amount increased to $10.22 million in 2000 and then 
decreased in 2001 to $7.72 million.  Licensing revenue increased from $8.42 million in 2002 to 
$17.79 million 2005 before declining to $13.5 million dollars in 2006.  This dynamic is not 
surprising due to the impact that the sale of one big innovative finding can have on licensing and 
commercialization revenue.  The descriptive statistics also show that the data is not normally 
distributed.  This is expected due to the diverse nature, mission and economies of scale that exist 
among different research universities and technology transfer objectives.   
4.3 Hypotheses Testing, Results and Discussion  
In Chapter 3 hypotheses were developed based on the literature reviewed and the 
expectation about commercialization activities at research universities.  In the following sub-
sections, results and analysis for each hypothesis are provided.   
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Patents Issued, Licenses Executed, Start-Ups Formed and Inventor 
Share of Royalty Income Drive the Disclosure Process   
To test the hypothesis that disclosures per year (Y) is dependent on patents issued per 
year (PI), licenses executed per year (LE), start-up companies formed per year (SUP), and the 
inventors percent share of royalty income (IRI), the model presented in equation 1 was used: 
),,,( ttttt IRISUPLEPIfY =        … (1) 
where t is the year 1996 or 2006.  One is interested in the sign of the coefficients and their 
statistical significance about how each of the independent variables impact disclosures at 
research institutions.  The hypothesis was that as patent, license and start-up company formation 
activities increased, as well as the percentage of royalty sharing to the inventor increased, the 
number of disclosure to the university would increase. Equation (1) was tested using four 
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different forms of the equation, gaining insight related to the robustness of our model.  The 
results in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 support the hypothesis that disclosures is positively influenced 
by patents, licenses, start-up companies formed and percentage of royalty income shared with the 
inventor.  However, it should be noted that while the coefficient sign for the percentage of 
royalty income shared with the inventor is positive, it is not statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  This implies that while an increase in the inventor’s portion of royalty income is 
positively correlated with an increase in disclosures, it is not a significant driver in the disclosure 
process.  The results indicate that in both 1996 and 2006, for every U.S. patent that was secured, 
the number of disclosures per year increased by 3, while the log-log model indicates that a 1 
percent increase in patents issued, increased the number of disclosure in 1996 and 2006 by .35 
and .47 percent, respectively.  The 1996 and 2006 t-value for U.S. patents issued implies this 
variable was statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  For every start-up companies formed 
the number of disclosures per year increased by 5 and 4 in 1996 and 2006, respectively.  This t-
value for the variable was statistically significant at the 5 percent level in both years.  Licenses 
executed had a t-value that was statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 2006, but was not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent in 1996.  This would fit the intuition because licenses are 
not as visible in the commercialization process.  Specifically in 1996, when entrepreneurship was 
not promoted like it is in today’s research institutions the success of licenses were not as widely 
promoted through public relations efforts.  The low constant coefficient and t-value is also an 
indication that there are few other drivers in the disclosures process.  All four forms of the model 
also indicate that the data is very robust and the integrity of the results held.  In Table 4.8 and 
Table 4.9 the stepwise regression results on 1996 and 2006 disclosures are reported.  It is 
observed that patents issued are the biggest driver of disclosures at the university, with patents 
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explaining 78 percent and 87 percent of the impact on disclosures in 1996 and 2006, 
respectively.  The stepwise regression also indicated that licenses executed had a minimal impact 
on 1996 disclosures, while in 2006 it had a larger significant influence on explaining disclosures.  
Overall, the results indicate that one fails to reject hypothesis 1, implying that patents issued, 
licenses executed and start-up companies formed drive the disclosures process, while one rejects 
the portion of the hypothesis 1 that states the inventor’s percent of royalty revenue drives the 
disclosure process.   
Table 4.6-Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 on the Impacts of 1996 Disclosures 
Disclosures 1996 Linear Log-Log Semilog Exponential
Patents Issued 1996 3.02177 0.35899 51.55676 0.01537
(9.80)** (3.34)** (3.36)** (2.97)**
Licenses Executed 1996 0.26148 0.30832 15.33149 0.01077
(0.96) (2.85)** (1.00) (2.36)*
Start-Ups Formed 1996 5.14845 0.24754 39.79418 0.0487
(2.30)* (2.34)* (2.63)* (1.30)
Inventors Revenue 0.2077 0.26496 -30.91817 0.00723
(as a percent) (0.72) (1.15) (0.94) (1.49)
Constant 1.78509 1.18086 9.93361 2.99346
(0.12) (1.28) (0.08) (11.49)**
Observations 91 56 56 90
R-squared 0.81 0.72 0.61 0.52
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 4.7-Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 on the Impacts of 2006 Disclosures 
Disclosures 2006 Linear Log-Log Semilog Exponential
Patents Issued 2006 3.03 0.48 84.80 0.01
(11.32)** (8.93)** (4.61)** (2.86)**
Licenses Executed 2006 1.00 0.24 37.76 0.01
(4.74)** (4.16)** (1.86) (3.88)**
Start-Ups Formed 2006 4.20 0.14 60.07 0.01
(2.33)* (2.27)* (2.89)** (0.71)
Inventors Revenue 0.33 0.10 21.27 0.00
(as a percent) (0.90) (0.77) (0.48) (0.50)
Constant 2.15 2.08 -362.99 3.99
(0.10) (3.88)** (1.97) (18.42)**
Observations 91 73 73 91
R-squared 0.91 0.82 0.61 0.59
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Table 4.8-Stepwise Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 Impact on 1996 Disclosures 
Disclosures 1996 Step #1 Step #2 Step #3 Step #4
Patents Issued 1996 3.59 3.18 2.98 3.02
(18.02)** (13.76)** (9.89)** (9.80)**
Licenses Executed 1996 6.30 5.29 5.15
(3.14)* (2.38)* (2.30)*
Start-Ups Formed 1996 0.28 0.26
(1.05) (0.96)
Inventors Revenue 0.21
(as a percent) (0.72)
Constant 17.17 12.81 12.05 1.79
(3.03)** (2.30)* (2.15)* (0.12)
Observations 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.81
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 4.9-Stepwise Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 Impact on 2006 Disclosures 
Disclosures 2006 Step #1 Step #2 Step #3 Step #4
Patents Issued 2006 4.28 3.40 3.05 3.03
(24.06)** (15.59)** (11.42)** (11.32)**
Licenses Executed 2006 1.15 1.00 1.00
(5.66)** (4.77)** (4.74)**
Start-Ups Formed 2006 3.95 4.20
(2.22)* (2.33)*
Inventors Revenue 0.33
(as a percent) (0.90)
Constant 43.68 20.85 19.12 2.15
(5.35)** (2.57)* (2.40)* (0.10)
Observations 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.91
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
4.3.1 Hypothesis 2: Increased University Commercialization Intensity 
Previous research states that the university entrepreneurial spirit is increasing over time.  
Renault, et al. (2007) observed that university collaborations with industry are generating 
intellectual property and commercialization pathways in ways that were previously unthinkable.  
Etzkowitz (2003) claims a new revolution at universities has expanded the research mission to 
include economic development through technology transfer.  These statements are made by the 
authors by reviewing just the quantity of patents, licenses executed and start-up companies 
formed at all universities over the last few years.  Their analyses do not consider the fact that 
more institutions are now prioritizing technology transfer.        
Hypothesis 2 seeks to confirm these statements through cross-sectional data analysis.  It 
tests whether each specific commercialization activities increased over the past eleven years 
conducting a paired analysis using equation 2: 
Ho: 019962006 >− ββ         … (2) 
where β is the average of each of the following commercialization activities: Y=disclosures, 
SRE=system research expenditures, PI=patents issued, LE=licenses executed, SUP=start-ups 
 42
formed, and LICINC=licensing income dependent variable disclosures per year.  We tested each 
commercialization activity using a one-tailed t-test.  Results in Table 4.10 support our hypothesis 
that the commercialization activities at universities is increasing. 
Table 4.10-Paired T-Test Results 
Upper Lower
Pair 1--Disclosures: 79.22 95.74 10.04 99.16 59.28 (7.89)** 90
Pair 2--Research Expenditures: 205.96 206.64 21.66 249.00 162.93 (9.51)** 90
Pair 3--Patents Issued: 9.49 21.24 2.23 13.92 5.07 (4.26)** 90
Pair 4--Licenses Executed: 18.71 25.40 2.66 24.00 13.43 (7.03)** 90
Pair 5--Start-Ups Formed: 2.55 4.81 0.50 3.55 1.55 (5.06)** 90
Pair 6--Licenses Income: 10.04 24.83 0.26 15.21 0.49 (3.86)** 90
Absolute value to t statistics in parentheses
**significant at 1%
 =Year 2006- Year 1996
Paired Difference
Differenece
d.f.t-value
Std. Error 
Mean
Std. 
DeviationMean
 
The results show that the mean of each commercialization activity increased from 1996 
to 2006.  The results for each paired t-test had a high t-value, indicating that the results are 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Overall, one fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
commercialization activity of universities has increased over time, thus providing more statistical 
evidence to the claim that entrepreneurship and commercialization is becoming a more frequent 
action of research universities day-to-day activities.   
4.3.1 Hypothesis 3: The Lagged Effect in Commercialization Strategies 
Etzkowitz (2003) found that the financial contribution from commercialization activities 
enhanced the research missions at universities by supporting new research.  Figure 1.1 in Chapter 
1 conceptualized the model showing the system-dynamic impact that intellectual property 
policies have on invention disclosure, commercialization, and revenue generation, which leads to 
more invention disclosures.  The conceptual model that commercialization revenue generates 
disclosures in future years was tested using the collected data.  The lag effect of other variables 
in research and development at universities was also of interest.   
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Hypothesis 3 tests the lag effect of the impact of: the independent variable licensing 
income (LICINC) on the dependent variable disclosures (Y); the independent variable research 
expenditures (SRE) on the dependent variable disclosures (Y); and the independent variable 
licensing income (LICINC) on the dependent variable research expenditures (SRE). The 
hypothesis models are present in equations 3-5: 
)( 6,5,4,3,2,12006 −−−−−−= ttttttLICINCfY       … (3) 
)( 6,5,4,3,2,1,2006 −−−−−−= tttttttSREfY       … (4) 
)( 6,5,4,3,2,12006 −−−−−−= ttttttLICINCfSRE      … (5) 
where t-x represents licensing income each year from FY 2000 to FY 2005 in equations 3 and 5 
and research expenditures each year from FY 2000 to FY 2006 in equation 4.  Considering a 
2006 dependent variable, one hypothesizes that the coefficient impact of each of the independent 
variable will have a lagged impact and will grow as you move back in time to a certain period 
and will decrease its impact further back in time.  It is also believe the statistical significance of 
the coefficients will increases with the results.  In this analysis one is interested in the sign, 
statistical significance and the lagged impact of each explanatory variable.  The results of the 
four forms of each model identified as equation 3-5 are found in Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13.    
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Table 4.11-Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 on Lag Impact of Research Expenditures 
on 2006 Disclosures 
Disclosures 2006 Linear Log-Log Semilog Exponential
Licensing Income 2005 0.13 0.24 40.65 0.00
(in millions) (0.67) (1.82) (1.39) (0.71)
Licensing Income 2004 0.28 0.03 4.55 0.01
(in millions) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.45)
Licensing Income 2003 7.55 0.05 -12.46 0.04
(in millions) (2.34)* (0.25) (0.30) (1.57)
Licensing Income 2002 -10.46 -0.24 -39.86 -0.05
(in millions) (3.59)** (1.41) (1.08) (2.33)*
Licensing Income 2001 5.45 0.21 32.18 0.03
(in millions) (3.29)** (1.70) (1.20) (2.60)*
Licensing Income 2000 4.14 0.07 41.64 0.01
(in millions) (7.26)** (0.79) (2.04)* (1.48)
Constant 94.70 4.27 87.59 4.43
(7.35)** (41.00)** (3.87)** (48.62)**
Observations 91 79 79 91
R-squared 0.66 0.43 0.36 0.31
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
The results (Table 4.11) of the lagged impact of disclosures on licensing revenue are 
intuitive and support our hypothesis.  The impact of licensing income in 2004 and 2005 has a 
minimal but positive impact on disclosures, and the t-values indicate that the variables are not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  However, starting in FY 2003, every one million 
dollars in licensing income generates 7.5 more disclosures in 2006.  The coefficients then had a 
positive impact on 2006 disclosures of 5.4 and 4.1 per million dollars generated in licensing 
revenue during FY 2001 and FY 2000, respectively.  Therefore, it appears there is a lagged 
impact of licensing income on disclosure that is maximized at approximately 3 years after the 
revenue is collected.  The t-value of each variable did in fact increase, as expected, from FY 
2005 to FY 2000, from no significance in FY 2005 and FY 2004, to a 5 percent level of 
statistical significance in FY 2003, and finally to a 1 percent significance level in each of the 
years back to FY 2000.  One will notice an unexpected sign on the 2002 licensing income 
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independent variable.  Further investigation does indicate there is a three to five year cycle, 
where two to three years of licensing income has a positive affect on disclosures, and one to two 
years of licensing income has a negative affect on disclosures.    
Table 4.12-Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 on Lag Impact of Research Expenditures 
on 2006 Disclosures 
Disclosures 2006 Linear Log-Log Semilog Exponential
2006 System Research 0.05 0.68 80.65 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (0.46) (2.35)* (1.04) (0.41)
2005 System Research -0.27 -0.82 -121.02 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (2.98)** (1.41) (0.77) (1.52)
2004 System Research 0.45 0.19 91.76 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (2.56)* (0.28) (0.49) (1.55)
2003 System Research 0.02 0.25 14.83 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (0.09) (0.46) (0.10) (0.86)
2002 System Research -0.09 0.29 38.19 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (0.52) (0.59) (0.29) (0.63)
2001 System Research 0.00 0.01 18.73 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (0.04) (0.05) (0.25) (1.23)
2000 System Research 0.35 0.39 54.89 0.00
Expenditures (in millions) (2.53)* (1.14) (0.60) (0.54)
Constant 10.59 -0.67 -804.80 4.10
(0.93) (1.65) (7.39)** (44.40)**
Observations 91 78 78 91
R-squared 0.82 0.75 0.57 0.53
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
The results in Table 4.12 indicate that research expenditures from FY 2006-FY 2000 do 
not have a statistical significant lagged impact on disclosures in 2006.  The coefficient signs in 
FY 2005 and FY 2002 are also not as predicted.  Again, upon further investigation there seems to 
be a cyclical impact that research expenditure have on disclosures.  Therefore, it does not support 
the original hypothesis that higher research expenditures in previous fiscal year lead to higher 
disclosures in other years.  This model could be impacted by the contractual research agreements 
with many sponsors that only transfer research funds into the university on a year-by-year basis 
over the time period of the research projects.   
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Table 4.13-Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 on Lag Impact of Licensing Income on 
2006 Research Expenditures 
Research Expenditures 
2006 (in millions)
Linear Log-Log Semilog Exponential
2005 Licensing Income 0.46 0.19 103.31 0.00
(in millions) (0.90) (1.66) (1.46) (0.87)
2004 Licensing Income 5.79 0.03 22.92 0.01
(in millions) (1.09) (0.18) (0.25) (0.51)
2003 Licensing Income 5.38 0.09 -62.41 0.03
(in millions) (0.65) (0.51) (0.62) (1.42)
2002 Licensing Income -18.34 -0.22 -71.15 -0.04
(in millions) (2.47)* (1.48) (0.79) (2.17)*
2001 Licensing Income 10.18 0.08 36.32 0.02
(in millions) (2.41)* (0.75) (0.56) (2.30)*
2000 Licensing Income 9.68 0.14 118.40 0.01
(in millions) (6.67)** (1.74) (2.39)* (1.99)*
Constant 263.34 5.32 238.29 5.44
(8.03)** (58.57)** (4.34)** (69.89)**
Observations 91 79 79 91
R-squared 0.58 0.43 0.33 0.32
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
In Table 4.13 it is observed that the coefficient and the corresponding signs of the 
dependent variables support the claim that there is a lag impact of licensing income on research 
expenditures in 2006.  However, the low R2 value and the high t-value and coefficient on the 
constant term indicate there are more important drivers in research expenditures.  This does 
make intuitive sense because of the minimal amount that licensing income contributes to the 
overall research budget of the university.  The statistical significance of the variables did 
increase over time to the 5 percent level in FY 2001 and the 1 percent level in FY 2000.  The 
impact of licensing income increased until FY 2001 generating $10.17 million in additional 
expenditures for every million dollars of licensing revenue earned and then decreased to an 
impact of $9.8 million in FY 2000.  This model does imply that the lagged impact of licensing 
income on research expenditures in 2006 is maximized five years from generating the revenue.   
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Overall, the results in Table 4.11 and 4.13 support the conceptual model in Figure 1.1 
where it is believed that disclosures lead to intellectual property commercialization, that generate 
additional research resources that lead to more disclosures of intellectual property.   
4.3.1 Hypothesis 4: University IP Policy Influences on Commercialization Output 
A major component of this thesis is to determine the impact, if any, that intellectual 
property policies have on the commercialization efforts at research universities.  The literature 
review indicates that university intellectual property policies constrain inventors and sponsors 
from disclosing inventions or discoveries, thus impeding the commercialization process.  
Hypothesis 4 indicates that universities intellectual property policies do have a significant impact 
on the commercialization output of the university.    
To test the hypothesis that commercialization output (disclosures (Y), patents issued (PI), 
licenses executed (LE), start-ups formed (SUP)) is dependent upon the dummy variables from 
the six components of the intellectual property policies (IPPj), considering each intellectual 
property policy separately, where j=1,2,…,6 for: 1=ownership policy, 2=sponsorship agreement 
structure, 3=university groups sharing in royalty revenue, 4=inventors percent portion of royalty 
income, 5=IP protection and commercialization decision-maker, and 6=decision turn-around-
time rule from disclosure.  The hypothesis models are represented in equation 6-10:  
)( jt IPPfY =          … (6) 
)( jt IPPfPI =          … (7) 
)( jt IPPfLE =         … (8) 
)( jt IPPfSUP =         … (9) 
)( jt IPPfLICINC =         … (10) 
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where t represents the years 1996 and 2006.  In these models, all of the right-hand-side variables 
are dummy variables; therefore we expect low R2 values.  Ones interest in these models is the 
coefficient signs in response to the dropped dummy variable and the statistical significance of the 
independent variables on the specified commercialization output dependent variable.    
Overall, none of the intellectual property policies produced results indicating that the 
policies play any significant role in research disclosures decisions therefore one rejects the null 
hypothesis.  Considering the analysis in Section 4.1.1 through Section 4.1.6, there are not many 
differences in policies across universities.  This is an indication that university intellectual 
property policies are not impacting the commercialization activities at universities.  These 
findings supports the survey analysis done by Reddy (2007) that found most faculty at Kansas 
State University were not even aware of an intellectual property policy existed and that inventors 
could share in a portion of net royalties received at the university.  These regression results 
provide statistical evidence that other influences, possibly tenure and promotion or knowledge 
about technology transfer process, impact the commercialization process.    
However, one regression model generated results that indicate one intellectual property 
policy does play a role in the inventors’ decision to disclose the invention or discovery to the 
university rather than to publish the research finding.  The influence that the turn-around-time 
variable had on disclosures was studied.  The dummy variable categories for this analysis were 
as follows: 30 days from disclosure, 60 days from disclosure, 90 days from disclosure, 120 days 
from disclosure, 150 days from disclosure, 180 days from disclosure, 365 days from disclosure 
and in an unspecified time.  For this model the dummy variable 30 days from disclosure was 
dropped.  The expectation was that all of the independent variables would have negative 
coefficient signs.  This is based on the impact that the delayed public disclosure of research 
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findings has on the tenure and promotion process and the timeliness in the market development 
to ensure profitable commercialization of the intellectual property.  Table 4.14 shows the results 
that for the most part, confirm the expected coefficient signs and the belief that a quicker turn-
around-time positively influences disclosure of inventions.  Again, none of these estimates were 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, therefore fails to support the hypothesis that this 
component of the intellectual property policy significantly influences commercialization 
activities.  However, it should also be noted that this component of the intellectual property 
policy has the highest t-values, meaning they have the biggest influence on the disclosures at the 
university.     
Table 4.14-Regression Results of IP Disclosure Decision Turn-Around-Time on Disclosures 
Linear Models 60 days: 90 days: 120 days: 150 days: 180 days: 1 year: Unspecified Time: Contant
Disclosures 1996 -124.54 -85.39 -26.88 -154.00 -131.14 7.67 -84.08 165.00
R-Squared: .14 (1.87) (1.31) (0.39) (1.44) (1.87) (0.10) (1.33) (2.67)**
Disclosures 2006 -257.81 -187.72 -51.88 -270.50 -259.64 -33.83 -168.71 334.50
R-Squared: .15 (2.06)* (1.53) (0.40) (1.34) (1.97) (0.23) (1.41) (2.87)**
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided insight and analysis on the review of intellectual property policies 
and the results and analysis of our econometric models.  Overall, because all commercialization 
activities depend on the disclosure decisions of faculty and researchers, it is not surprising that 
the results for the hypotheses on the relationship between disclosures and commercialization are 
the most statistically significant.  As indicated in the review of the literature, experts believe the 
commercialization process is driven by faculty disclosures.  This cross-sectional analysis 
supports that research.  None of the intellectual property policies were found to have a significant 
influence on commercialization activities.  However, the intellectual property policy related to 
turn-around-decision time did have a more significant influence on disclosures.  This is intuitive 
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because faculty are less interested in disclosing inventions to the university the longer it takes to 
receive confirmation.  Faculty members currently have more incentive to publish the research 
and be rewarded in the traditional academic tenure and promotion process.   
The analysis led to the conclusion that private institutions have institutional property 
policies and procedures similar to private industry.  The research analysis indicated that patents 
issued, licenses executed and start-up companies formed are the main indicators of disclosures.  
The analysis also revealed that the commercialization intensity of patents issued, licenses 
executed, start-up companies formed, research expenditures and licensing income has increased 
over time.  One failed to reject the hypothesis that licensing income has a lagged impact on the 
disclosures and research expenditures in 2006.  Finally, with respect to the hypothesis that 
intellectual property policies at institutions have a significant impact on commercialization 
activities, the analysis revealed that such policies do not have a significant impact.   
In the next chapter we will conclude the research thesis and give implications of the 
research.   
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
This research was motivated by the need to gain insight on how policies and initiatives at 
research universities affect the institutions’ level of commercialization initiatives.  At the 
beginning of this study, it was hypothesized that university intellectual property policies have a 
significant role in determining the level of commercialized output.  It was also believed that 
intellectual property disclosures, past successes in commercialization and additional revenue 
from the commercialization of protected intellectual property impacted the level of 
commercialization output at the university. 
Past research literature on the evolution of technology transfer and commercialization at 
research universities was reviewed.  The focus on commercialization intensified in the 1980’s 
due to a decline in federal research funding and the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.  The 
research also found that research universities are benefiting from this revolution.  Because of 
commercialization activities, universities are gaining additional non-government research 
funding, attracting highly recruited faculty members and students, and gaining additional public 
notoriety and support for the research they are conducting.  Based on past surveys of research 
faculty members, it has been determined that many university policies and initiatives addressing 
intellectual property have impacted the entrepreneurial orientation of the university.  The policies 
also affect faculty members’ priority on the disclosure and commercialization of research 
findings.  It is believed that policies and initiatives such as the ownership rights of resulting 
intellectual property, the sharing of royalty income resulting from commercialization of 
intellectual property and the impact of traditional tenure and promotion policies impact the 
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faculty members attitude toward the commercialization process.  Research also indicated that the 
commercialization initiatives of universities has been impacted by past success stories related to 
different commercialization pathways and the reinvestment of revenue generated from past 
intellectual property innovation.   
Most studies in this area have used response surveys and trends analysis of 
commercialization activities at all research institutions to arrive at their conclusions.  Here, 
cross-section data from FY 1996-FY 2006, collected by the AUTM organization, was used to 
test many of those observations and conclusions.  The intellectual property policies at 91 
universities across the United States and Canada were also analyzed. The analysis of university 
intellectual property policies concluded that a majority of research universities still take a very 
traditional approach to technology transfer.  It was also found that private institutions operate 
with similar, less liberal policies, because they do not need to offer the incentives that public 
universities must offer to attract highly productive faculty.     
The cross-sectional data analysis confirmed and rejected a number of different 
hypotheses proposed based on the conclusions of past studies.  For example, the analysis 
indicated that patents issued, licenses executed and start-up companies formed were the main 
determinants of disclosures in 2006.  Those results indicated a change from 1996 disclosures, 
where only patents issued and start-up companies formed had an influence on the number of 
disclosures.  The data analysis also confirmed Hypothesis 2 that patents issued, licenses 
executed, start-up companies formed, research expenditures and licensing income increased 
between FY 1996 and FY 2006.   Data analysis failed to reject the third hypothesis that licensing 
income has a lagged impact on the disclosures and research expenditures in 2006.  However, 
analysis found that research expenditures have no statistically significant lagged impact on 
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disclosures in 2006.  The results of that model could be impacted by research sponsorship 
agreements that do not transfer the entire research funding amount to the university at the 
beginning of the study.  Finally, with respect to the fourth hypothesis, analysis found that 
intellectual property policies at institutions do not have a significant impact on 
commercialization activities.  These findings supports the survey analysis done by Reddy (2007) 
that found most faculty at Kansas State University were not even aware of an intellectual 
property policy existed and that inventors could share in a portion of net royalties received at the 
university.   
The conclusions of this research hold important implications for the commercialization 
activities at research universities.  First, university administrators should focus less on the 
structure of intellectual property policies and focus more on communicating to researchers the 
benefits of disclosing research results to the university and possibly commercializing the 
research finding.  This is supported by the results that demonstrated the disclosure process is 
driven by past success of different commercialization pathways.  Additionally patents issued, 
licenses executed and start-up companies formed, not policies and incentive structures, 
encourage non-commercially driven faculty to explore commercialization options.  Next, 
research universities should understand that the commercialization activities will continue to 
evolve as they become increasingly important as funding from government declines.  In years to 
come, research programs at universities cannot be expected to remain innovative if these 
institutions do not advance their outcomes to market.  Finally, universities must understand that 
the commercialization of research generates additional resources that can be used to increase 
disclosures and research expenditures.  These additional resources can be used to leverage 
 54
additional research expenditures that contribute to the basic research programs at universities, 
thereby advancing the public good.     
5.2 Future Research 
This research established the need for further analysis on other factors that influence 
research faculty decisions to pursue commercialization efforts.  Specifically, the impact of tenure 
and promotion policies on commercialization should be studied.  Such a study should target 
institutions that formally recognize technology transfer and commercialization activities as valid 
contributions to tenure and promotion.  The research output at those universities can then be 
compared to other research institutions commercialization initiatives and research output.  There 
is also a need for research that determines how administrators and technology transfer officials 
make decisions regarding the commercialization of intellectual property and how royalty revenue 
can be maximized and should be shared.  This type of information should be communicated to 
faculty members and thus increase disclosures.  This could also increase research support since 
non-governmental research sponsors would better understand the benefits of the research studies 
they sponsor.   
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